Security of supply must be seen as a more integral part of comprehensive security, stresses National Emergency Supply Agency

The National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) emphasizes that Finland must ensure civil society’s resistance to crises in parallel with the military defence. NESA notes in its goals for the 2023 Government Programme that, as new and more complex threats emerge, resources are dwindling for security of supply. The major shift in our operating environment requires reinforcing security of supply and strengthening its funding.

Security of supply exists for the purpose of maintaining society’s vital functions even in the event of a major crisis or disruption. In recent years, we have seen how our operating environment and security situation may change quickly, and why we cannot let the development of security of supply cease or slow down. On the contrary, now is the time to do more and better. In the coming years, the exceptional global situation caused by Russia’s attack on Ukraine is a particular focus for security of supply.

Summary: A word from NESA to the next government

1. As new threats emerge, the standards of security of supply must be redefined and it must be seen as a more integral part of comprehensive security. Comprehensive security and national defence require the effective protection of society’s functions, including critical infrastructure – military capability alone is not enough. The situation in Ukraine is proof of this. Only a functional and resilient society can guarantee effective military capability.

For the Government Programme: Widespread influencing and new threats primarily target civilian society and its critical infrastructure and social resilience. Security of supply is reinforced as part of comprehensive security. NESA is given total responsibility for coordinating the protection of critical civilian infrastructure during disruptions and emergencies under normal conditions.

2. The variety and number of threats have increased, but the resources for security of supply are dwindling. It is vital that the next government secure the National Emergency Supply Fund’s functioning by strengthening its funding, for example. Furthermore, swift and permanent action must be taken to raise the annual yield of the strategic stockpile fee and dismantle the mechanism leading to the downward trend of the yield.

For the Government Programme: The security of supply funding system and the strategic stockpile fee are reformed to strengthen the financial base of security of supply operations and keep the National Emergency Supply Fund functional in the new security situation.

3. Finland’s current security of supply model and operations are an excellent fit for implementing the expanding and intensifying security of supply and resilience operations of the EU and NATO, and the model should be developed with these in mind.

For the Government Programme: NESA is tasked with acting as the national point of contact for the EU’s Critical Entities Resilience (CER) directive as well as developing NATO resilience operations and maintaining the overall picture.

Here you can read more reasons for NESA’s views