Scenario on the use of military force against Finland and security of supply

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Security of supply means the safeguarding of the livelihood and protection of the population, the economic activities essential for the economy, national defence and security of the country, the production and availability of essential goods, materials and services and critical infrastructure in the event of and during severe disruptions and emergencies.

The National Emergency Supply Agency is a government agency that supports other authorities, businesses and organisations in maintaining and developing security of supply and plans and implements preparedness measures to safeguard security of supply in the event of and during severe disruptions and emergencies.

Publisher: The National Emergency Supply Agency
Layout: KMG Turku
Year of publication: 2026



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Introduction

Security of supply refers to the preparedness and readiness of the critical functions of society to respond to serious disruptions and emergencies affecting society as a whole. Such disruptions can be caused by natural disasters, large-scale accidents, pandemics, global supply challenges, deliberate malicious influence operations targeting society and, in extreme situations, military conflict.

Security of supply is not built by any one actor alone. Instead, it is built by working together to identify and manage the risks associated with dependencies – all actors in society need to be involved. In order for preparedness and contingency measures to be effective and mutually supportive, it is essential for different actors to have a sufficiently consistent understanding of the potential threat landscape and for their plans to work together. To support this, the National Emergency Supply Agency, in collaboration with its key stakeholders, has drawn up this scenario on the most significant threat to the basic security of society: military conflict. The scenario identifies the different stages of a military conflict – from crisis to escalation and protraction – and the measures required in each stage to safeguard the vital functions of society. These stages and the means to influence them are described in the SUUNTA planning framework for security of supply, which describes the operating methods and more detailed capabilities required to ensure security of supply in the different stages of a major disruption.

The military conflict scenario is not a prediction, but rather a description of a situation that severely challenges the continuity of the vital services of society. It is intended to help perceive the measures required in different functions and sectors – and between them – to cope with a situation that challenges society's security of supply to an extreme degree. This kind of examination of extreme events also supports preparedness for more limited disruptions: a comprehensive and flexible set of capabilities and tools improves society's ability to respond to situations that have not been identified in advance, but for which existing preparedness can be applied.

The first confidential version of this scenario was published in 2025 to support the work of the National Emergency Supply Agency and the National Emergency Supply Organisation. The National Emergency Supply Organisation, which includes representatives of approximately 1,500 companies and dozens of public authorities, has found the confidential scenario to be widely useful in its work. With the publication of this public version of the scenario, we can now make it more widely available to support the preparedness of society as a whole. It was prepared with input from key authorities involved in Finnish security of supply work, whose comments helped to make the scenario even more widely usable.

The preparation of the scenario was contributed to by experts from the Finnish Defence Forces, Traficom's National Cyber Security Centre and the Finnish Supervisory Agency. Thank you to everyone involved for your valuable input in developing the content of the scenario! The scenario was published (in Finnish) on 28 April 2026.

How to use the scenario

The scenario is a tool – not a prediction

- The scenario does not describe the most likely future, but rather a single imaginary development path.
- The scenario is based on an imaginary situation in which Finland is subjected to the use of military force.
- The aim is not to predict what would happen in a war, or to describe in detail everything that might happen, but rather to stimulate thinking and support the assessment of preparedness needs.
- The scenario is a framework scenario, which means that it examines the operating environment without a specific perspective or detailed description of the actions of any particular actor or actors.

Accept the assumptions of the scenario as true while using it

- The value of the scenario comes from allowing us to temporarily accept the uncertain as true.
- Do not assess the credibility or likelihood of the scenario while using it – take its assumptions as given, even if they seem implausible or unlikely.
- Any conflicts between your own views and the scenario are useful: they help you to examine your own assumptions about the future and the basis for them.

Introduction to the SUUNTA planning framework for security of supply

The SUUNTA planning framework for security of supply analyses the societal severity and development of the impacts of disruptive events at different stages and thus the societal capabilities required to respond to them. The scenario is described in accordance with the stages of the National Emergency Supply Agency's SUUNTA planning framework.

The preparedness and readiness of society is primarily based on the independent preparedness of critical actors. For companies, this means business-driven preparedness. As a general rule, companies can cope on their own with disruptions that only affect their own business operations. To help with their independent preparedness, companies can make use of basic security of supply services.

When a disruption persists for a long time or affects several actors at the same time, its impacts start to be felt more widely in society in the form of continuity of supply disruptions. In these situations, actors are no longer able to restore their ability to function on their own or quickly enough, which means that joint action between companies and public authorities is needed. This cooperation is market-driven and supported by services that allow for enhanced cooperation without state control. However, these types of situations do not yet threaten people's livelihoods or the functioning of society as a whole.

In the most serious situations, the disruption threatens the security of supply of society as a whole and people's livelihoods. Such situations call not only for action by companies and public authorities, but also for extensive state intervention to safeguard the basic services of society, as the market and individual authorities are no longer able to resolve the situation on their own or quickly enough. This intervention can encompass a wide range of measures, some of the most well known of which include the release of the state's emergency stockpiles and state control based on the Emergency Powers Act or legislation concerning emergency conditions. In serious disruptions, these measures still need to be complemented by the specific capabilities and networks of individual companies, however.

The SUUNTA planning framework takes into account not only the severity of the disruption, but also its duration. Although the durations described in the framework are only indicative, they describe the ability of people and the market to respond and adapt in different stages. In the early stages of a disruption, uncertainty, surprise and lack of control are more pronounced. As the situation escalates, adaptation begins, and operating models become increasingly clear. In a protracted situation, a whole new set of established operating methods emerge, and new market solutions based on business considerations begin to mitigate the situation.

The war scenario describes progression

Through operational activities, proactive preparedness measures are taken before a disruption occurs and support is provided for the management of disruptions during the different stages of a disruption. The definition of preparedness levels and the related measures and services take into account the diversity of preparedness measures and potential changes in preparedness levels in the different timeframes of a disruption.

Stages of development of a disruption



Scenario – development of a military threat in Finland in stages

Initial situation

The war in Ukraine has reached a ceasefire. Russia has increased the total size of its armed forces to 1.5 million and significantly increased the military forces stationed near the Finnish border. A significant proportion of these forces are expected to be able to mobilise quickly. Russian military exercises also include extensive cyber warfare training, such as GPS/GNSS jamming, radio interference and location spoofing, which increases instability, especially in Finland's border region.

The partnership between Russia and China has deepened. Although the two countries do not formally have a common arms industry or military alliance, they engage in extensive R&D cooperation, in addition to their economic partnership. Cooperation between China and Russia is most visible in the Arctic region, where tensions are extremely high.

The United States has turned inward and increasingly withdrawn from Europe as a result of domestic political developments. The US continues to sell arms to NATO countries, but otherwise operates passively, with its attention and preparedness focused elsewhere for domestic and geopolitical reasons.

Europe is divided in terms of its political situation and ability to function. On the one hand, there is a willingness to cooperate, but at the practical **decision-making level, the finding of common solutions and commitment to them are slow and uncertain.** Another issue subject to protracted negotiations is the burden-sharing for the reconstruction of Ukraine.

Finland has long been subject to strong political pressure from Russia, related e.g. to monitoring the demilitarisation of Åland. This pressure has increased during the late summer and autumn. **Finland, which has joined NATO and is arming itself for war, is openly presented as a military threat to Russian national security.** In the Russian narrative, Finland's armament is presented as preparation for war against Russia. Russia's actions are also reflected in increased cyber activity, which parallels the rise in drone and reconnaissance alerts. The increase in reconnaissance is reflected in the digital environment, including systematic cyber reconnaissance and vulnerability mapping. Finnish authorities say that Russia has increased its deep precision strike capability. Deep precision strike capability in this context refers to a capacity to strike over a long distance using various systems.

Russia holds major military exercises during the summer and autumn and has reserved large training areas both at sea and in the air for them. The areas of operation extend close to Åland, and a Russian warship has been lingering in the international waters of the Gulf of Bothnia for a long time. During the Russian military exercises, a Finnish coastguard vessel near Helsinki is forced to protect Finland's territorial integrity by firing warning shots. As a result of the Russian military exercises, maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea is disrupted. For example, a "lost mine" stops commercial shipping for several days.

Finland is subjected to exceptionally intense intelligence gathering activities and the numbers of various incident reports have increased dramatically. Some of the reports are unfounded, but the relevant authorities are forced to expend resources to investigate them. The authorities are strongly prioritising the investigation of incident reports. The growing number of incidents is also reflected in the cyber security environment, where more intrusion attempts, gate scans and targeted cyber reconnaissance are being detected than usual.

Events in recent years have shown that it is relatively easy and cheap to disrupt the basic functions of society. **The troubled situation at Finland's eastern border is a cause for concern.** Russia is reported to be using third-country nationals for instrumentalised migration. There are constant media reports of migrants crossing the land border. Various estimates and rumours abound regarding the scale of the phenomenon. There is an unconfirmed estimate going around that up to 10,000 people have crossed the border. To make matters worse, suspicious recruitment advertisements are appearing on social media, offering money to people in exchange for carrying out various acts of vandalism, sabotage or surveillance – this is stated to be a typical way of exploiting proxy actors in other EU countries.

There is a great deal of discontent and unrest in Finnish society. Throughout the year, economic forecasts have had to be constantly revised downwards. Unemployment is at its highest level since the depression of the early 1990s. This, combined with the rising cost of living and the perceived deterioration of public services, is causing deep public dissatisfaction with the prevailing situation. Various types of protests have been widespread throughout the autumn.

An interview with a researcher studying the resilience of society: *"It seems relatively clear that the prolonged unfavourable economic situation cannot fail to have an impact on preparedness, especially at the level of individual actors. Investments and stockpiling may not be possible to the extent that might be desirable from a preparedness perspective. The extent to which the situation of individual actors affects the crisis resilience of the system as a whole is of course highly relevant to security of supply. After all, preparedness is to a large extent about ensuring that a potential disruption to the availability of a particular product, for example, does not have a fatal impact on the system as a whole."*

The market has responded by downgrading Finland's credit rating, and investors see Finland's country risk as having increased significantly. International cyber crime groups and nation-state threat actors are also attempting to exploit Finland's growing country risk through opportunistic attacks, which is estimated to be a part of a wider escalation of the operating environment.

Stages of development of war in the fictional scenario

Image: AI

Stage 1: Crisis 0–3 months: Crisis and uncertainty turn to war

It is late autumn. The polar vortex is weakening and the long-term weather forecast promises a long period of severe frost from the second week of January onwards. The ice situation in the Bay of Bothnia and the Gulf of Bothnia is expected to become exceptionally difficult as the winter progresses.

In the first week of December, random disruptions in the digital environment increase dramatically, affecting the functioning of digital services and various control systems. These telecommunications disruptions are assessed to be partly the result of denial-of-service attacks targeting network services and critical infrastructure support services in particular. The attacks do not paralyse the entire network, but cause widespread disruption and place a significant strain on the defending parties. The situation is particularly worrying in electricity generation, with disruptions affecting the grid, wind farms and the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant. Some of them are suspected of having been caused by insider influences. According to experts, the disruptions should not even be technically possible without someone affecting the systems from the inside. Several parties claim responsibility for the attacks, including ones classified as criminal organisations, but also ones calling themselves "hactivists". Successful data breaches are accompanied by ransom demands. In some systems, the use of destructive wiper malware is also detected, designed to destroy automation and control systems rather than simply lock them down. Maintaining an up-to-date situational picture of cyber security is challenging due to so many simultaneous events.

Satellite-based services become unreliable. Several submarine electricity and telecommunications cables fail at the same time, affecting data traffic and the security of electricity supply. The resulting power shortages make the situation particularly difficult for energy-intensive process industries, where some production facilities have to be shut down due to unpredictable power outages so as to avoid equipment breakdowns. Ensuring the sufficiency of electricity necessitates the implementation of rolling blackouts.

At ports, problems with IT systems, power outages and routing changes slow down cargo handling, causing bottlenecks in transport, which further challenges the planning and smoothness of stock rotation. Supply challenges are particularly evident in import-dependent products, but the outlook for domestic production is also expected to deteriorate rapidly if transport cannot be normalised.

There are increasing problems with the availability of many key medicines, such as certain antibiotics, painkillers, diabetes drugs and preparations used to dissolve vascular clots. Attempts are being made at the European level to tackle the shortage of medicines, but the situation is complicated by the fact that the market is reacting strongly to the rapidly growing threat of war. As has historically been the case in the past, other countries

in the vicinity of the potential military conflict have restricted exports, especially for critical goods, in order to safeguard growing domestic demand in the event of an escalation.

Labour supply challenges are worsening while at the same time workloads are increasing rapidly. Labour shortages make it difficult to run services, maintain systems and carry out repairs. Significant numbers of foreign-background people working in Finland in the health and social services sector and in IT and technical specialist positions are leaving the country. In total, more than 20,000 foreign-background employees, the vast majority of them being highly educated, have left the country in the last two months. Some international companies have also pulled their foreign employees out of Finland.

The labour supply challenges force some of Finland's wellbeing services counties to rapidly downsize their care services. This raises concerns among the relatives of elderly people receiving care services. Labour challenges are also widespread in the logistics, early childhood education and care and education sectors. Able-bodied pensioners are primarily concerned with helping their relatives cope with growing everyday life management challenges.

Financial and payment systems are disrupted. Interbank payment networks remain operational, but consumer services – such as online banking, identification services and card transaction approval – are subject to significant disruptions. Identity theft, identity fraud and simultaneous denial-of-service attacks are eroding public trust in digital channels.

At the same time, information influence activities against Finland are increasing rapidly. In many cases, these information influence activities are combined with cyber and physical influence activities. Fake news, bomb threats and e.g. rumours of water contamination instil fear in the public and cause some people to hoard fuel, food, medicine and cash. There are reports circulating on social media that some Russians in Finland are considering requesting assistance from Russia based on allegations that the authorities are systematically discriminating against and monitoring Russians in Finland. Although it seems obvious that Russia is behind the recent incidents, this cannot be unequivocally proven, and Russia consistently denies the allegations. At the same time, Russia is using the allegations as part of its own influence activities to reinforce narratives that support its own interests and strategic goals.

Finnish citizens' trust in public authorities and their communication is declining. Messages from the authorities are not comprehensively reaching the populace, especially people with a foreign background. Citizens have started to demand action as concerns about access to electricity, heating, food, fuel and medicines continue to grow.

Host Nation Support is commenced in accordance with Finland's national concept for host nation support. At the same time, civil protection structures are being erected and shelters are being prepared for potential use.

Key aspects of the situational picture of the crisis stage:

- Extensive and diverse hybrid influence activities.
- Strong increase in intelligence gathering activities and significant increase in incident reports.
- Rumours and allegations abound of e.g. discrimination against the Russian population, information influence activities.
- Medicines in short supply across Europe.
- Resilience and availability of the labour force deteriorating.
- Hoarding: fuel, food, medicines, cash.
- Increase in the incidence of various disruptions.
- Interference in international satellite connections.
- Significant deterioration of the cyber security situation: malware and denial-of-service attacks, cyber attacks.
- Disruptions to telecommunications connections and digital services.
- Power outages.
- Disruptions in fuel distribution.
- Disruptions in banking services.
- Growing and increasing disruptions in supply chains.
- Functioning of many industries compromised by growing number of serious disruptions.

Image: AI

Stage 2: Serious disruption 3–6 months: State of defence and transition to war economy

On 17 December, the Finnish Parliament is due to start its Christmas break. A Russian fighter jet that was the target of a visual inspection flight crashes in Finland. News quickly spreads that the jet was shot down, but the claim remains unconfirmed. Russia blames Finland and NATO. The Finnish Defence Forces and the National Emergency Supply Agency, among other Finnish authorities, continue to increase their readiness, exchange of information between authorities is further increased and the Finnish Government is kept constantly informed of the situation. According to a military intelligence report, Russia has the capability to launch a limited military operation, if it so decides, in a week at the earliest. Defence Command Finland has already issued an order to prepare for the dispersal of material in order to protect material from military attack and to prepare for the deployment of forces. Finland moves towards a war economy, which means more state control and more economic resources being directed towards defence and preparedness, affecting the daily lives of citizens and business operations alike. The National Emergency Supply Agency and other Finnish authorities implement crisis measures within the limits of their resources to further increase the level of preparedness. However, civilian authorities are in urgent need of additional funding to ensure the implementation of their crisis response.

Due to the recent rapid developments, the view in the Finnish Government is that the threat of war in the near future is obvious and that Finland must also prepare for the possibility of a protracted military conflict. In light of past events and their consequences, the Government, in cooperation with the President of the Republic, declares a state of emergency in Finland. This means that the criteria for emergency conditions as defined in section 3 of the Emergency Powers Act – in particular points 1, 2, 3 and 6 – are met in a way that requires the immediate application of emergency powers.

Bulletin to citizens – Declaration of emergency conditions: “Finland is assessed to be currently facing a serious external threat, as a result of which the functions vital to society may be substantially prevented or paralysed. The realisation of the threat endangers the functioning of society and the living conditions of the population to a significant degree. The declaration of emergency conditions enables the introduction of emergency powers under the Emergency Powers Act. These measures are aimed at ensuring the safety of the population and the continuity of the functions vital to Finnish society.”

Since the threat assessment also involves the possibility of Finland being subjected to military force, a presidential decree is drafted to declare a state of defence, which is submitted to Parliament immediately after its issue. Parliament approves the decree. As of 3 January, Finland is in a state of defence.

In Russia, Finland's precautionary measures and declaration of emergency conditions are painted as aggression planned by NATO and the launch of a military operation against Russia. Russia considers an attack against it to constitute aggression by the entire treaty organisation if it is carried out by a member of the treaty organisation. At the same time, several Finnish television and radio broadcasts are hijacked for short periods, with claims supporting Russian narratives appearing in their broadcasts, the origins of which are difficult to trace. The incident confuses the communications environment and undermines public trust in traditional media, especially as some of the hijackings target local radio stations and online broadcasts.

Six days after the declaration of a state of emergency, Russia launches what it calls a special military operation against Finland. The operation begins with sabotage (including assassination attacks on key personnel) and large-scale missile and drone strikes. Subsequent Russian operations combine information influence activities, cyber influence activities and sabotage with the use of military force.

From the outset, critical Finnish companies are key targets for Russia and also participate in responding to the situation: In addition to military sites, Russia's targets in Finland include structures and operations critical to security of supply. The Russian strikes damage Finland's oil refinery, the gas terminal in Ingå, ports in southern Finland, a significant amount of grid infrastructure including main transformers, critical telecommunications facilities, key road, rail and bridge networks, logistics centres along Ring Road III and several chemical production facilities, among others. The first strikes also include attacks against a number of critical data centres. As a result, the cooling systems of the centres are severely damaged, due to which many server rooms have to be shut down to prevent overheating.

The use of force is truly massive and the strikes appear to be precisely targeting sites that are most critical for the functioning of Finnish society and security of supply. The protection of critical infrastructure in partnership with public and private actors proves essential. Many of the strikes are also successfully defended against and physical damage remains localised rather than crippling systems that are vital to Finnish society as a whole. However, services and systems are subject to significant disruptions and outages. Finland also commences the protection and repair of critical infrastructure within the limits of available resources. Civil defence structures and management are activated across Finnish society.

The attacks cause immediate damage and cascading effects: equipment at Finland's oil refinery and ports are damaged, damage to the electricity grid causes widespread power outages and damage to roads and bridges cuts rail and road links. Damage to chemical industry facilities leads to local chemical spills and environmental and health hazards. Russia also carries out a targeted attack on one key telecommunications company, damaging its main control centre. As a result, the company is forced to move all of its control centre operations to a backup facility reserved for crisis situations. Cascading effects continue to weaken Finnish control and communication systems, making it difficult to build a situational picture and manage critical networks.

Commercial shipping in the Baltic Sea, and especially in the Gulf of Finland, is severely disrupted: Russian warships attempt to keep the supply link to Kaliningrad open while other coastal states work together to secure their own logistical links. The Baltic Sea becomes a war zone, temporarily halting commercial shipping traffic, probably for several weeks or months. Direct maritime traffic to the Baltic countries, Poland and Germany is expected to be significantly disrupted, possibly for a prolonged period, and efforts are made to reroute freight via Sweden.

Finland's logistics rapidly become fragmented: disruptions to port operations and main routes fragment supply chains and increase delivery delays and bottlenecks, and securing the supply of fuel, medicines and food becomes critical. Military operations, equipment and troop movements take up a growing share of Finland's remaining logistical capacity. As a result, civilian transports are moved to the backup routes of backup routes, further complicating the situation. The breakdown in foreign trade causes an immediate economic shock. Prices rise rapidly.

The impact on Finnish society is widespread: rationing is started, but power and heat outages, water supply disruptions, telecommunications outages, fuel distribution disruptions, internal migration and evacuations, people directly injured in the attacks and health problems related to chemical exposure increase the workload of health and safety workers and the pressure on the system. A large proportion of urban dwellings become uninhabitable in just over a day after heating is cut, when their indoor temperature drops below 10 degrees Celsius. People try to move out of big cities where possible, but access to services in rural areas is limited. People are especially eager to flee Finland's capital, Helsinki. The failure of communication networks momentarily isolates citizens from each other, while fake news and information fragmentation increase uncertainty and make it difficult to form a coherent picture of the situation.

The presidential decree to declare a state of defence, prepared in connection with the declaration of a state of emergency, is submitted to Parliament. Parliament approves the decree. As of 3 January, Finland is in a state of defence.

The criteria of Article 5 of NATO are met. The decision on collective ground military intervention is carefully considered. At the same time, the EU and bilateral allies of Finland respond rapidly by providing material, logistical and humanitarian aid, and international assistance operations are launched. Sweden and other countries in the region provide extensive civilian and military support to Finland where possible, while trying to avoid being targeted by Russian military force. This situation leaves Finland weakened and dependent on external material support, which is difficult to deliver due to the situation in the Baltic Sea. The worsening ice situation hinders the exploitation of connections in the Bay of Bothnia and the Gulf of Bothnia. Northern land routes have also suffered extensive damage.

Key aspects of the situational picture of the serious disruption (war) stage:

- Widespread and significant attacks on critical infrastructure.
- Finland's electricity system is in a state of major disruption. Large parts of the country are intermittently dark. Rolling blackouts are implemented in an attempt to manage the power shortage. Recovery assessments are complicated by the possibility of further attacks.
- The Finnish Main Line railway line between Helsinki and Oulu is broken.
- The arterial road network is cut at several points.
- Transport in the Baltic Sea is practically at a standstill.
- Electric public transport is at a standstill in Helsinki.
- Finnish airspace is closed to civilian traffic.
- Fuel distribution has stopped at most stations, electric car charging is not possible.
- Breaks in food cold chains.
- Telecommunications infrastructure has suffered significant damage, causing serious disruption to data and communication connections.
- Heavy energy-intensive processing industries have largely stopped.
- District heating is significantly disrupted or completely cut.
- Water treatment and wastewater treatment are extensively disrupted.
- Digital services, such as payment services, are highly unreliable and subject to unpredictable outages. As a result, people's trust in these services is shattered. Concerned and angry people blame the authorities and service providers for the situation.
- Functioning of many industries compromised by serious or insurmountable disruptions.
- The public is unclear about the situational picture of security; military rumours and the illusion of knowledge become more dangerous than the lack of information.

Stage 3: Escalation 6–12 months: Expansion and prolongation of the war

As a result of Finland's initial military and security of supply response, Russia fails to achieve its objectives through sabotage, limited military operations and deep precision strikes, leading to an escalation of the conflict and large-scale war. It is assessed that Russia's direct operations against civilian targets will continue to increase. The economic and human costs grow day by day.

As the situation becomes more protracted, opportunistic cyber attacks increase significantly. Both criminal groups and nation-state threat actors take advantage of the chaos by targeting Finland with extortion attempts, denial-of-service attacks and cyber reconnaissance.

The state of defence and transition to a war economy have made changes to the operating logic of Finnish society as a whole that go beyond productive and economic restructuring or changes in resource management. As a result, Finnish society is now in a constant state of adaptation and adjustment. The role of the state in the economy grows significantly, and Finland's national debt increases rapidly despite substantial external military, financial and humanitarian aid. Finland tries to keep the economy going, and companies try to stay in business. However, there is a significant contraction in business activity in certain industries, especially in the SME sector.

The allocation of resources changes: funding for e.g. the social services and culture sectors is cut, while investment in defence, security of supply, internal security and infrastructure increase. Government asserts control over production, consumption and labour mobility. Society's structures, priorities and use of resources are adapted to support defence, security of supply and internal security objectives. In manufacturing, the focus shifts from civilian products to strategic resources: the metal, electronics and chemicals industries are redirected to produce materials needed for weapons systems, communications infrastructure and logistics. Civilian production is reduced and critical industries are given priority in the allocation of raw materials, energy and labour.

Maritime transport in the Baltic Sea shows signs of partial and intermittent recovery as a result of rerouting, an improvement in the protection situation and some ports and routes being re-opened. Sweden and Norway play an essential role in re-routing Finnish transports. Efforts have also been made to negotiate with Russia to allow certain shipments. However, the total volume of Finnish maritime transport has fallen significantly from normal levels, ranging between 30 and 60%.

Efforts to maintain and restore functional capacity are hindered by periodic Russian strikes, with attacked sites being hit again after they have been repaired. Some critical infrastructure and services are restored, but various disruptions continue. There are constant and worsening shortages of components, spare parts and human resources. The technical performance of Finnish infrastructure, and hence its repair capacity, is gradually and permanently deteriorating as a result of the constant alternation of repair and destruction. Lack of critical components leads some Finnish organisations to resort to informal or unregulated procurement channels. As a result, hardware and software whose origin is difficult to verify and which may contain backdoors or manipulation end up on the market. This increases the risk of systems being compromised undetected.

As the war escalates and moves clearly into a ground-attack phase, the importance of healthcare increases significantly. The ability to maintain living conditions at a decent level becomes paramount. Finnish people move away from border regions in increasing numbers, but some still want to stay in their own homes. Engaging in business activities near the front line is also very challenging, and many critical companies are forced to close down.

Finland's transition to a war economy has a major impact on the daily lives of its citizens. The availability of consumer goods decreases and rationing is introduced. Supply challenges regarding e.g. fuel increase, especially in sparsely populated and logistically difficult to reach areas. Citizens are encouraged to pitch in for the common good – either by contributing their labour, conserving resources or supporting morale and unity.

Finnish media and cultural productions begin to reflect prevailing conditions: patriotism, sacrifice and shared responsibility are now the main messages. Public discussion changes, and critical perspectives are silenced or marginalised in the name of national unity.

Key aspects of the situational picture of the escalation stage:

- Significant need to prioritise production and consumption while production is being destroyed and the possibility of imports is reduced.
- Companies go bankrupt and near the front line even critical companies are forced to close down or relocate to safer areas.
- Critical infrastructure deteriorates gradually (due to being destroyed, repaired, destroyed again).
- Poor availability of spare parts, raw materials and components.
- Reception, distribution and processes of foreign aid are initiated but hindered by weakened logistics.
- Rationing: fuel, food, electricity, medicines.
- Poverty increases and everyday life is difficult for many people.
- Extensive and continuous disruptions in the supply of electricity, heat and water, lasting from hours to weeks.
- Continuous disruption of telecommunications connections, some international connections down.
- Digital services are repeatedly disrupted, hindering companies and the public alike. There are disruptions in bank account and card payments, lasting from a few hours to several days.
- Emergency stockpiles are being depleted faster than they can be replenished.
- Manufacturing and electricity production at half capacity at best.

Image: AI

Stage 4: Protracted disruption over 12 months: War of attrition – transition from buying time to enduring it

From rapid response to structural change. At the beginning of the military conflict, Finnish society's primary objective was to buy time. The first few months were spent increasing preparedness, mobilising reserves, deploying stockpiles and contingencies, scaling up critical operations and scaling down less critical ones. Emergency legislation allowed for faster decision-making, and previously planned and practised preparedness models were put to use. It was clear from the start that the crisis was likely to be severe, but it was also hoped that it would be over quickly. At this stage, security of supply acted as a temporary mechanism to support society through the crisis. The key lesson of the initial stage of the war was that known uncertainties, or risks, become widely more probable during war, in addition to which you have to contend with surprises for which you did not know to prepare.

With no end to the war in sight, temporary solutions give way to permanent structures. As the conflict drags on, Finnish society gradually shifts away from the expectation that a return to normality would happen anytime soon. This shift is not based on any single decision, but rather on a series of small adjustments at different levels. Companies shift from short-term to indefinite planning, and households start to prepare for deepening scarcity. Security of supply and the safeguarding of the basic living conditions of the population are becoming a permanent operating model instead of being just a crisis mechanism. The key question becomes whether Finnish society can shift from consuming resources to sustainably renewing them.

In a protracted state of war, the basic logic of the Finnish economy changes fundamentally, external support becomes increasingly important and national debt increases rapidly. Reliability takes precedence over efficiency, and instead of the least expensive option, options that can be repaired, maintained and managed within the country are favoured. Stockpiles become part of production chains instead of being their back-up systems. Slowness and redundancy are accepted if they contribute to resilience. Work is no longer just an occupation or a livelihood, but part of shared resilience. Retraining is quick and practical, and more of an obligation than an opportunity. Consumption becomes a moral issue: what to buy, why and from whom. People's choices no longer reflect only preferences, but also their commitment to shared resilience.

As the conflict continues, the issue of control over access to the most essential resources – water, food, energy and medicines – becomes more acute. If Russia is able to have a comprehensive impact on the availability of these resources in Finland, Finnish society's ability to function and thus its defence capabilities will be substantially weakened. The boundaries between military and civil society become blurred. Defence is no longer just about troops and equipment, but also electricity grids, hospitals, telecommunications and logistics. Every disrup-

tion to infrastructure is felt on the front line, and every success on the civilian side reinforces military capability. Defence is a system that now extends to the everyday life of every citizen.

Labour shortages challenge business operations as part of the population is on the front line, some have left the country and others are taking care of people and civilian infrastructure at home. At the same time, the financing situation of companies is difficult: financing is only available under strict conditions. The economy contracts further due to business challenges. Third-sector organisations play a key role in complementing services and providing social support.

The role of the state increases and decision-making is centralised. Budgets start to resemble operational plans, with prioritisation based on criticality rather than political compromise. Regions and municipalities are given more responsibility for implementing logistical and local priorities. At the same time, the need for transparent decision-making, fair burden-sharing and consistent communication increases. The biggest internal risk is not administrative failure, but the erosion of trust. For a society to be resilient, citizens need to perceive the system as fair and understand its objectives. While the state bears strategic responsibility, responsibility for the creative solutions that facilitate everyday life management shifts increasingly to citizens, NGOs, companies and regional and local actors. The third sector reaches groups that are beyond the reach of public authorities and supports social cohesion.

Although the public is mentally adapting to the situation, psychological stress and fatigue inevitably start to increase. The unity felt in the initial stage of the conflict goes a long way, but over time, fatigue sets in. The question "what do we do" is replaced by the question "how much longer is this going to take". People's experiences of the war become increasingly differentiated: some are constantly engaged in highly stressful work tasks while others live relatively normal everyday lives. This differentiation increases the risk of social tensions and undermines social cohesion. It is crucial for the resilience of Finnish society that citizens retain a sense of common purpose and a shared bright vision for a time after the war.

The most notable change in a protracted war is temporal. Society no longer seeks to return to the way things were or to buy time, but instead adapts to operate in a long-term crisis. Security of supply starts to mean the constant replenishment of resources, disciplined prioritisation and keeping society functioning in the face of scarcity. War is no longer a state of emergency, but rather an extreme, constantly changing condition under which society builds its resilience and its future.

Key aspects of the situational picture of the protracted disruption stage:

- War becomes a permanent condition under which society builds its resilience in the face of scarcity.
- Security of supply becomes a permanent operating model in a protracted crisis.
- A return to normality is no longer expected, as society adapts to operate under permanent uncertainty.
- The logic of the economy changes: reliability takes precedence over efficiency and cost optimisation.
- Stockpiles are integrated into production and supply chains.
- Supply of critical resources (water, food, energy, medicines) takes centre stage.
- The line between military and civil society blurs, infrastructure is part of defence.
- Labour shortages and financing difficulties faced by companies undermine the economy.
- The role of the third sector in complementing basic services and social support grows.
- State control and decision-making is centralised, prioritisation is based on criticality.
- The greatest internal risk is the erosion of trust and social cohesion.
- Psychological strain and the differentiation of the people's experiences increase over time.

Image: AI

Adaptation – The war ends

Upon the end of the war, Finnish society gradually begins to shift towards a new everyday life. The normalisation phase is accompanied by both relief and uncertainty: the tension felt during the fighting recedes, but is replaced by the need to assess how to restore society one step at a time. The key issues are the timeframe and order in which restrictions can be lifted, how to increase market orientation in a controlled manner and how to restore the basic functions of society in a sustainable way after a long state of emergency.

Normalisation does not mean a return to the way things were, but rather a new equilibrium that takes into account the impact of the war on the economy, infrastructure, the ability to function of organisations and the daily lives of citizens. Many functions have to be rebuilt and permanently changed. Companies and the public sector work side by side to kick-start economic activity, repair supply chains and restore access to services.

The emotional and social impacts of the crisis on individuals, communities and workplaces play a key role in adaptation. To normalise the situation, citizens must be helped to process their experiences, rediscover a sense of security and return to their daily routines.

Security of supply services follow the stages of development of the disruption

The range of security of supply services includes means to respond to disruptions of different severities and lengths. New measures are introduced as and when the situation requires. The SUUNTA planning framework for security of supply can be used to identify security of supply service needs in different situations.



BASIC SERVICES — Company-driven

- **Guidelines**
- **Training**
- **Exercise**
- **Analysis/report**
- **Network**

- Identification of security-of-supply-critical companies and objects to be protected
- Situational picture

SECURITY OF SUPPLY SERVICES — Cooperation-driven

- **Information sharing systems**
  - E.g. Krivat, HAVARO
- **Capability building**
  - E.g. Shared-use solutions, capability funding, contractual arrangements

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- Special monitoring and investigations
- Facilitation of network cooperation and coordination of authority cooperation

SERVICES FOR SERIOUS DISRUPTIONS — State-driven

- **Storage** (security, obligation, protection, collective)
- **Production reserve/production modification**
- **Repair capabilities, services**
- **Service reservation**
- **Ownership partial ownership**
- **Crisis funding**
- **Pre-planned procurement**
- **Databases**
  - Now: SUOKO, ATV, VAP In the future: e.g. Energy consumption, component, raw material



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