



*CEO Janne Känkänen at NESAs seminar January 19th 2023
(EMBARGO 2.15 pm)*

Dear distinguished international guests and security of supply colleagues,

The COVID-19 pandemic has been ravaging the world for nearly three years now. Meanwhile there is a full-scale war raging in Ukraine, in the middle of Europe, that has shocked the world with its cruelty.

Purposeful destruction of civilian infrastructure and society's functions. People without electricity and heating in major cities, in the middle of winter. Attacks aimed at disrupting telecommunications and payment systems. People at the limit of their psychological and physical endurance. Death and terror. Food and water distribution interrupted or severely disrupted.

In addition to all this, the war raging in Ukraine has given rise to the worst energy crisis that Europe has faced in decades. The impacts of this crisis – both direct and indirect – are unpredictable and complex. And in many respects, still shrouded in mystery.

These threats, which just a few years ago were only theoretical, have now become tangible – bringing the face of the worst possible crisis chillingly close to Finnish society and individual citizens, shaking our sense of security. As a result, preparedness has been raised to the forefront of public discussion. At the same time, our mental crisis tolerance is also being tested.

Even during severe crises and disruptions, we need to be able to maintain the vital functions of society at a sufficient level.

The Finnish approach to security of supply is not just about emergency stockpiles. Instead, it is an extensive operating model covering the whole of Finnish society. Finland's security of supply is maintained by a network managed and coordinated by the National Emergency Supply Agency that connects public authorities, the private sector and civil society.

Our approach to security of supply is deeply rooted in Finnish realism. The same realism that has compelled us to preserve our conscription system and maintain our national defence at a good level. The same realism that has pushed us to maintain our civil defence shelters and provide training to various operators in national defence and comprehensive security despite the end of the Cold War.

Finland has kept its eye on the ball. Even in so-called good times. This is something that we should be proud of and grateful to our security of supply operators, whose efforts over the decades have also laid the foundation for the preparedness that we now have to maintain and expand upon amid new kinds of threats and the growing threat of Russia.

Having reached the age of 30, the NESAs has a lot to be grateful for. Over the years, we have brought together thousands of professionals from different fields to share and learn common crisis management practices. **Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to give a big thank you to all security of supply operators and professionals;** to us at the NESAs, the security of supply pools and the entire National Emergency Supply Organisation, companies, NGOs, the Finnish Defence Forces and other



public authorities. Our network is one of a kind in the world. Thank you for all your efforts for preparedness, efforts that are now more important and topical than ever.

With the global situation suddenly changing and the likelihood of a military threat rising, it is only natural that we should clarify and update our operations. In fact, we have already started to do just that.

Dear seminar participants,

The exceptional global situation and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have fundamentally changed not only the security environment, but our geopolitical reality as well.

The changed security environment highlights the importance of preparing for both military threats and broad-spectrum influencing, meaning hybrid threats.

Meanwhile, geopolitical tensions and the division of the world into democratic and authoritarian countries are increasing the likelihood of global economic disruptions, meaning severe value and supply chain disruptions.

When Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, Finland immediately made some wise and far-reaching decisions in the spring of 2022. We proceeded to strengthen our national defence, in addition to which we made the historical and necessary decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO.

However, our national capacity to weather severe crises – or prevent them from occurring – also depends on the crisis tolerance of civil society. On how the vital functions of our society, meaning the supply of electricity, clean water, food and telecommunications, can be maintained in the worst possible circumstances.

The new threats that we now face are ample reason to examine security of supply in comparison to the organisation and resource allocation of military national defence. **In fact, it would make sense to start viewing security of supply increasingly as the counterpart of military national defence in civil society.** After all, comprehensive security and national defence require the functions of civil society to be effectively safeguarded as well; military capability alone is not enough. The terrible situation in Ukraine is an effective illustration of this.

This means that we need to implement measures to strengthen the protection of critical infrastructure, safeguard the security of the energy supply, take care of food security, ensure the availability of medicines, etc. However, even just the strengthening of critical infrastructure to better withstand disruptions requires additional investments in digital safeguards, physical protection and information security.

Dear listeners,

Is it possible to give a 'service promise' to citizens in regard to security of supply?

The objective of both the NESA and the National Emergency Supply Organisation is to ensure that the functions critical to society can be maintained at a sufficient level in all circumstances. This objective is also the service promise of security of supply, which must be fulfilled through national preparedness and the development thereof. The keywords are 'sufficient' and 'with minimal disruptions.'



To fulfil our service promise, we need to take care of all areas of security of supply: our situational awareness and analysis must cover changing threats, we must understand threats and risks, we need to have a clear strategic direction, our sector-specific planning must be effective and up to date, and the way in which we implement measures must be comprehensive and address our vulnerabilities.

In addition to all this, we need to have a clear understanding of the importance of civic preparedness. While the activities of the private sector and public measures are naturally vital aspects of this, individual citizens also can contribute to security of supply. In relation to this, it has been great to see public awareness of personal preparedness increase in recent years. Considering the current circumstances, this is something that we should actively maintain and promote.

Dear attendees,

What should you expect of Finland's national security of supply work in the future? How will we respond to challenges? The level that we are at now is a good starting point. However, further development is needed to address our vulnerabilities. Especially the vulnerabilities highlighted by the current global situation and the ongoing change of the operating environment, which include the threat of war, broad-spectrum influencing and global economic disruptions.

Of course it is not enough to prepare only for military threats. We must also take climate change and things like extreme weather phenomena and their impacts on security of supply into account in our long-term preparedness work.

By now, it has become apparent that we should re-examine the extent and scope of our preparedness. With this in mind, I would like to highlight some examples of areas where we are already exploring new solutions.

Firstly, the importance of endurance and mental resilience should not be underestimated. In fact, maintaining a sense of security even during a crisis is a prerequisite for keeping society's wheels turning. This is where culture and cultural operators play a key role. The human capital generated by a diverse – and pluralistic – culture has the capacity to support our society and its unity even during severe crises.

The public discussion confirms that cultural operators also have an interest in participating in the activities of the security of supply community. As such, we are currently exploring the possibility of establishing a new culture pool under the National Emergency Supply Organisation. This new pool would bring together operators in the culture sector, allowing them to contribute to the development of Finland's comprehensive security and address questions concerning mental crisis tolerance. In addition to this, the new pool would serve to underline the importance of taking pluralism into account in security of supply work.

Secondly, the energy war launched by Russia has pushed the question of the future of energy security of supply to the forefront. The key factors for weathering this crisis will be our ability to utilise technology and our capacity to change our operating methods. The private sector and markets play a critical role in the availability of energy as well. At the same time, the stockpiling of fossil fuels is still a valid operating model, and will probably remain so for a long time yet. That being said, it is not enough on its own in the current circumstances.

Finland has always lived off forests – and today there are a wide range of interests and expectations associated with our forests. As a result, we need to examine our forests from the perspective of security



of supply as well. The fact is that wood and wood-based materials play a very important and constantly growing role in both the energy production and energy security of supply of Finland. Because of this, we need to make a determined effort to develop sustainable security of supply solutions for wood.

In fact, we have already engaged in cooperation in this area to facilitate the creation of a wood terminal network, for example. Such a network would allow Finland to stockpile wood in the same way that we currently stockpile grain. In addition to this, we should give some thought to whether compulsory stockpiling should be expanded to also cover bio-based fuels.

One possible solution could be the establishment of dedicated security of supply forests.

In addition, as is the case in security of supply in general, we need to make sure that we have the necessary know-how and sufficient labour available. After all, critical know-how is one of the cornerstones of security of supply.

Thirdly, over the past year, there has also been a great deal of discussion about the importance of critical infrastructure and, more specifically, the vulnerabilities that threaten our crisis tolerance, especially in the present circumstances. Here, too, our current level of preparedness is a good start, but the new situation that we find ourselves in also compels us to reassess both our objectives and our methods. Items that we have already added to our agenda include the level of cyber and digital security, physical protection, information security and the strengthening of back-up power solutions.

However, in this new security environment and amid growing threats, we also need to have a national-level understanding of the right level of preparedness and of how the resources required for maintaining this level are to be allocated.

Dear distinguished guests,

Resilience and security of supply has a very strong international dimension. Maybe now more than ever.

Deepening co-operation bilaterally with our partners as well as in the multilateral context is both desirable and necessary, taking into account the cross border nature of risks relating to resilience and security of supply.

Finland cannot survive on its own, when facing these threats. This is particularly true in the modern global environment. Whilst horrible, Ukraine's experience demonstrates this vividly: Ukraine's success so far in maintaining and upholding, to the extent possible, its critical infrastructure, keeping it operating, has depended on their ability to interact and co-operate with international partners. For a high degree of resilience, both a level of self-sufficiency as well as international interaction are needed.

Our national interest is that our partner countries improve their national arrangements for resilience and security of supply.

Sweden is a natural partner for us in preparedness, and we have a long-standing co-operation arrangement in place with our Swedish colleagues, at the MSB.

To advance our bilateral co-operation in a concrete manner, we have recently discussed with our Swedish colleagues a project regarding joint stockpiling. This is still in an exploratory phase, but we are ready and prepared to progress with this joint endeavor as quickly as we can.



The scope as well as other details of the idea will now be sketched out with a view to developing a feasibility study on joint stockpiling by the end of this year.

It is my firm belief that this would be a natural extension to our national arrangements and would add yet another dimension to our overall resilience in a very timely and fitting way. There are a number of other areas that potentially call for joint solutions. For example, I see a lot of potential in developing further joint arrangements in digital infrastructure and logistics.

For these reasons, I am particularly happy that Charlotte Petri-Gornitscka, head of the MSB, is here with us today to share her thoughts about the evolving co-operation between our agencies – and indeed between Sweden and Finland in these challenging times.

The approaching NATO membership will add yet another dimension to our work on resilience, along with its core task of collective defence and deterrence. For a long time, NATO was the only international forum that allowed a comprehensive approach to resilience. For this reason Finland has participated in NATO's work as a close partner already for over 25 years. As a future member of the Alliance, we are therefore well placed to contribute even further, be that through discussions and sharing best practices related to preparedness and the whole-of-society approach, through exercises and stress testing, or contributing with expert staff to NATO's resilience structures. Within NATO, an extra reinforcing layer will be added to our preparedness.

At the same time, also the EU has made great progress in developing its approach to resilience. The Critical Entities Resilience directive, which came into force only this week, brings another important dimension to strengthening our resilience. Most importantly, it creates common minimum standards and a level playing field for companies maintaining critical functions throughout the Union. Furthermore, the new initiative for a Single Market Emergency Instrument aims at strengthening access to critical goods and material in crisis, in concrete ways applying EU solidarity also in the area of security of supply and resilience.

All in all, there is a lot that is going on in preparedness internationally. We at NESA will be determined to seize this opportunity, drawing on our deep know-how on preparedness and improve our national resilience and security of supply – and that of our closest partners.

Dear participants,

Security of supply and preparedness are characterised by a certain intrinsic paradox. This paradox stems from the fact that effective preparedness is more often than not invisible, or at least not reported on. In other words, when we succeed, or when the operators of our extensive cooperation network manage to prevent a cyber attack or an electricity shortage, for example, you will rarely hear about it on the news.

The risks and threats to Finland's security of supply are now more concrete than before. They are also more serious and complex than before. Because of this, we, as a society, are now faced with having to consider what kind of crisis tolerance and preparedness the extremely uncertain global situation and the growing threat of Russia require of us.

To ensure Finland's security of supply, it is essential that we safeguard the financial capacity of the National Emergency Supply Fund by strengthening the National Emergency Supply Fund. In addition to this, we need to ensure that Finland's preparedness is built upon cooperation with



the private sector and security of supply work based on corporate social responsibility in the future as well.

In order to fulfill the service promise of preparedness at all times, Finland also needs to step up its security of supply efforts.

An effective guiding principle for this is the notion that when you systematically prepare for the worst, you are prepared for almost everything.

However, this step up will not be realised unless we strengthen our national preparedness across the board and adapt it to the changed security situation. If we want to be effectively prepared in future – and remain a pioneer in security of supply in the future as well – we must hold on to our strengths, but also understand that **a crisis-proof civil society requires the same kind of comprehensive and long-term investments as our essential national military defence.**

The long history of Finland's security of supply work teaches us that we need to be far-sighted. But when the circumstances change, we must also be able to adapt. These qualities, far-sighted wisdom and rapid adaptation, now need to be leveraged by us security of supply professionals and our country's political leaders alike. By doing so, together we can make sure that even in a crisis, Finnish society will keep functioning and life will continue with minimal disruptions.